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appearance and regulate our emotions, with the goal of feeling "better than well." While these
technologies can help people adapt to their rapidly changing lifestyles, their use raises important ethical
issues.
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The PLoS Medicine Debate

Is It Ethical to Use Enhancement Technologies
to Make Us Better Than Well?
Arthur Caplan, Carl Elliott

B

or improvement
violates human nature
[2,4,5,7,8,9] and may
actually destroy it
[2,5,7,9]. It is the last of
these arguments that is at
the core of anti-meliorist
concerns.
It cannot simply be the
pursuit of improvement
that is making antimeliorists nervous. Many
religious traditions and
spiritual movements seek
perfection [10,11,12,13],
but these evoke no
negative commentary
from the anti-meliorists.
Nor do efforts to improve
animals and plants set this
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0010052.g001
crowd aﬂutter. Rather, it
is biomedical knowledge
It is in our nature as humans to strive
for self-improvement
being applied to you
(Illustration: Margaret Shear)
and me that is the crux
of their concern. They
fear that in applying new biomedical knowledge to improve
human beings, something essential about humanity will be
lost. If biomedical tinkering is allowed, we will destroy the
very thing that makes us human—our nature.
Anti-meliorism rests, however, on a very shaky foundation.
To support their position, the anti-meliorists must state what
human nature is. They do not. They must also be very clear
about why they see human nature as static. They are not. And
they must advance an argument about why human nature,
which has presumably evolved in response to an enormous
array of random forces, tells us anything about what is good
or desirable in terms of the traits humans should possess.
They cannot.
The ﬁght over whether there is any such thing as human
nature is a long-standing one [14]. But one can concede that
we are shaped by a causally powerful set of genetic inﬂuences
and still remain skeptical as to whether these produce a single
“nature” that all members of humanity possess. Is there a
single trait or ﬁxed set of traits that deﬁnes the nature of who
we are and have been throughout our entire existence on this
planet? Unless they can articulate this Platonic essence, antimeliorists do not have a foundation for their argument that
change, improvement, and betterment are grave threats to
humanity.
Worse still for anti-meliorists, we are clearly creatures
who have long tinkered with ourselves, using all manner of
technologies from clothing to telescopes to computers to
airplanes. Our view of our “nature” is closely linked to the

ackground to the debate: A variety of biomedical
technologies are being developed that can be used for
purposes other than treating disease. Such “enhancement
technologies” can be used to improve our appearance and
regulate our emotions, with the goal of feeling “better than
well.” While these technologies can help people adapt to
their rapidly changing lifestyles, their use raises important
ethical issues.

Arthur Caplan’s Viewpoint: Nobody is Perfect—
But Why Not Try To Be Better?
Perfection has come in for a lot of bad press recently.
A torrent of books and articles has recently appeared
[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9], all raising serious ethical questions
about the wisdom and morality of trying to use biomedical
knowledge to perfect ourselves or our offspring.
Biomedical scientists and physicians might be inclined to
ignore this literature as just so much abstract philosophical
handwringing. After all, it is almost impossible to ﬁnd
mainstream scientists arrogant enough to proclaim their
interest in perfecting anything, much less themselves or their
fellow human beings.
Beating up on the pursuit of perfection is silly. As Salvadore
Dali famously pointed out, “Have no fear of perfection—
you’ll never reach it.” Critics of those who allegedly seek to
perfect human beings know this. While often couching their
critiques in language that assails the pursuit of perfection,
what they really are attacking is the far more oft-expressed—
albeit far less lofty—desire to improve or enhance a particular
behavior or trait by the application of emerging biomedical
knowledge in genetics, neuroscience, pharmacology, and
physiology. Those who might accurately be termed “antimeliorists” wonder how we will ever resist the obvious
temptation to put this knowledge to use to alter ourselves.
They are quick to note that we have already given in to such
temptation—we augment our breasts, smooth our wrinkles,
and pump ourselves full of antidepressants.
Putting the brakes on biologically driven human
betterment would have real consequences for science. Some
lines of research would be slowed or restricted [3,5,8]. Their
application would be declared off-limits or at least tightly
regulated [1,2,3,4,5,7,8,9].
Why is the drive to improve ourselves so disturbing to
the anti-meliorists? Their arguments cluster around three
key worries: that the pursuit of perfection by biomedical
means is vain, selﬁsh, and unrewarding [1,2,3,6,7], that
improving ourselves is unfair [1,3,4], and that enhancement
The PLoS Medicine Debate discusses important but controversial issues in clinical
practice, public health policy, or health in general.
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technologies that we have invented and to which we have
adapted [15]. We are already technological creatures.
Nor is there any normative guidance offered by our
evolutionary history that shows why we should not try to
improve upon the biological design with which we are
endowed. Augmenting breasts or prolonging erections may
be vain and even a waste of scarce resources, but seeking to
use our knowledge to enhance our vision, memory, learning
skills, immunity, or metabolism is not obviously either.
Ultimately, anti-meliorism posits a static vision of human
nature to which the anti-meliorists mandate we reconcile
ourselves. If anything is clear about human nature, it is that
this is not an accurate view of who we have been or what we
are now, or a view that should determine what we become.

First, the manufacturers of enhancement technologies
will usually exploit the blurry line between enhancement
and treatment in order to sell drugs. Because enhancement
technologies must be prescribed by physicians, drug
manufacturers typically market the technologies not as
enhancements, but as treatments for newly discovered or
under-recognized disorders. Selective serotonin reuptake
inhibitors were marketed not as personality enhancers,
or even only as treatments for clinical depression, but as
treatments for questionable illnesses like “premenstrual
dysphoric disorder” [16]. Fen-Phen was sold not as a mere
diet drug but as a treatment for obesity, which Wyeth, the
manufacturer, portrayed as a dangerous public health
problem [17]. Estrogen replacement therapy was initially
marketed as a risk-free way for women to extend their
youthfulness. But when a 1974 study found that estrogen
replacement therapy was associated with an increased risk of
endometrial cancer, the manufacturers added progesterone,
renamed the combination “hormone” replacement therapy,
and recast it as a treatment for medical problems associated
with menopause such as osteoporosis [6].
Second, an alarming number of supposedly risk-free
enhancements have later been associated with unanticipated
side effects, some of them deadly. Wyeth has set aside over
$16 billion to compensate the thousands of patients who have
developed valvular heart disease and pulmonary hypertension
after taking Fen-Phen [18]. A 2002 National Institutes of
Health study found that hormone replacement therapy
was associated with such an elevated risk of heart disease,
stroke, pulmonary emboli, and breast cancer that the study
was stopped prematurely [19]. Selective serotonin reuptake
inhibitors are currently embroiled in controversy over
whether they are associated with an elevated risk of suicide
[20].
Third, the most successful enhancement technologies have
been backed by tremendously inﬂuential public relations
campaigns. These campaigns have included ghostwritten
journal articles, industry-funded front groups, and lucrative
payments to academics, professional societies, and university
centers [21]. For example, GlaxoSmithKline marketed
paroxetine (Paxil) by promoting the previously obscure
diagnosis of “social anxiety disorder” through phony support
groups, celebrity spokespeople, a direct-to-consumer illness
awareness campaign, and generous payments to key opinion
leaders [22]. The manufacturers of estrogen replacement
therapy marketed the hormone in the 1960s by funding a
“research foundation” for Robert Wilson, the gynecologist
and author of the best-selling book Feminine Forever [6].
Wyeth marketed Fen-Phen by funding obesity research
centers, launching public ﬁtness campaigns, contracting
with a medical education company to produce a series of
ghostwritten journal articles, and making generous payments
to academic physicians who then published extensively
and testiﬁed for the drug’s safety to the Food and Drug
Administration [17].
The traditional worry about enhancement technologies is
that users of the technologies are buying individual well-being
at the expense of some larger social good. I may improve my
own athletic ability by taking steroids, but I set off a steroid
arms race that destroys my sport. I may get cosmetic surgery
for my “Asian eyes” or use skin lighteners for my dark skin,
but I reinforce the implicitly racist social norms that say that

Carl Elliott’s Viewpoint: Pharma’s Gain May Be
Our Loss
Those of us who worry about medical enhancement are
usually less worried about the technologies themselves
than about the larger social effects of embracing them too
enthusiastically. Just as you do not need to object to cars
to worry about urban sprawl, you do not need to object
to enhancement technologies to question where these
technologies may be taking us. It is not just technophobes
who wonder whether a society that consumes 90% of the
world’s supply of methylphenidate (Ritalin), where the
most proﬁtable class of drugs is antidepressants, and where
cosmetic surgeons perform liposuction on prime-time
television is a society that has somehow lost its way.
Let’s look at three of the most commercially successful
medical enhancements of recent years: selective serotonin
reuptake inhibitors, hormone replacement therapy, and the
diet drug fenﬂuramine-phentermine (Fen-Phen). What can
we learn from these interventions?

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0010052.g002

Where is the pursuit of the perfect face, body, and mind taking us?

(Illustration: Margaret Shear)
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Asian eyes or dark skin are traits to be ashamed of. The worry
is that some aspect of the way we live together, collectively, is
going to be damaged by actions that we take individually [4].
A market-driven health-care system brings this worry much
closer to home. The pharmaceutical industry is now the most
proﬁtable and politically powerful industry in the United
States [23]. It also has a huge ﬁnancial interest in creating a
demand for enhancement technologies. The pharmaceutical
industry can buy politicians to pass industry-friendly
legislation; it can buy academic scientists to publish favorable
journals articles; it can buy professional societies and patient
support groups to spread the word on the newly medicalized
disorders that its interventions are developed to treat [24]. It
can even buy bioethicists to dispense with any moral concerns
[25]. In this kind of political and economic climate, how
likely is it that dissenting voices will have any effect before it is
too late?

conservative critics who want to preserve “human nature.”
He dispatches those critics with admirable precision, but I
am not sure why he believes that group of critics includes
me. My worry about enhancement technologies has little
to do with human nature. My worry is that we will ignore
important human needs at the expense of frivolous human
desires; that dominant social norms will crowd out those of
the minority; that the self-improvement agenda will be set not
by individuals, but by powerful corporate interests; and that
in the pursuit of betterment, we will actually make ourselves
worse off.
It’s no secret that many Americans are deeply ashamed
of their personal shortcomings and inadequacies. Nor is it
any secret that these shortcomings and inadequacies can be
exploited for commercial proﬁt. But do we really want to
submit our health-care system to the same forces that have
made millionaires out of motivational speakers and diet book
authors?
Skepticism about enhancement technologies is not
equivalent to a wish to set back medical research and
declare some applications off-limits. This is a debate about
enhancing human traits, not curing human illness. To say
that our medical research agenda will be set back if we
restrict enhancement technologies makes no more sense than
saying that cancer surgery will be set back if the American
Broadcasting Corporation cancels its cosmetic surgery reality
TV show Extreme Makeover.
We live in a country where 46 million uninsured people
cannot get basic medical care, while the rest of us spend a
billion dollars a year on baldness remedies. It is not just the
inequity here that is so impressive. It is the fact that we have
gotten so accustomed to the inequity that we do not see it as
obscene.

Caplan’s Response to Elliott’s Viewpoint
Elliott professes to be unhappy about enhancement. What
arguments does he present to support his unhappiness? Not
many, and the arguments that he does offer miss the point
completely.
If people want to feel better, sleep less, have fewer hot
ﬂashes, better vision, or fewer wrinkles, then they may
want to use enhancement technologies to achieve these
things. Technology in itself isn’t driving us in any particular
direction—I believe that we decide where it should go. Elliott,
however, gravely warns us that you and I do not really decide
a direction when it comes to matters of enhancement. It
is—listen carefully for the Darth Vader–esque hissing—drug
companies!
The rest of Elliott’s viewpoint amounts to what is his
increasingly familiar harangue against the pharmaceutical
industry. The drug companies sucker us into buying
enhancement by getting us hooked on pseudotherapies. The
drug companies rob us of our will to fend off their siren-like
messages of better living through their chemistry. And the
drug companies get us feeling so bad about ourselves that we
empty our wallets on their latest overpriced geegaws.
Pharmaceutical companies may be evil incarnate. And
we may be putty in their pecuniary little hands. But that has
nothing at all to do with the question of whether there is
anything wrong with pursuing enhancement. When Elliott
eagerly dons his hair shirt to bemoan Big Pharma, he ﬁnds
so much sin to revel in that he forgets to give a reason, any
reason, why enhancement is, in itself, immoral.
At most he presents an argument for keeping the
pharmaceutical industry out of enhancement. Okay, so
let’s take Big Pharma out of the picture. If we left the
encouragement of enhancement to the government, the
military, schools, foundations, doctors, or parents, would this
now be morally acceptable? I think sometimes it would be.
And nothing that Elliott says provides any reason to think
otherwise.
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